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Autonomous vehicles (AVs) are coming to our streets. Due to the presence
of highly complex software systems in AVs, a new hazard analysis technique
is needed to meet stringent safety standards. Also, safety and security are
inter-dependent and inter-related aspects of AV. They are focused on shield-
ing the vehicles from deliberate attacks (security issue) as well as accidental
failures (safety concern), that might lead to loss of lives and injuries to the
occupants. So, the current research work has two key components: func-
tional safety and cybersecurity of the autonomous systems.
For the safety analysis, we have applied System Theoretic Process Anal-
ysis (STPA), which is built on Systems Theoretic Accident Modeling and
Processes (STAMP). STAMP is a powerful tool that can identify, define,
analyze, and mitigate hazards from the earliest conceptual stage of develop-
ment to the operation of a system. Applying STPA to autonomous vehicles
demonstrates STPA’s applicability to preliminary hazard analysis, alterna-
tive available, developmental tests, organizational design, and functional de-
sign of each unique safety operation.
This thesis describes the STPA process used to generate system design
requirements for an Autonomous Emergency Braking (AEB) system using a
top-down analysis approach for the system safety. The research makes the
following contributions to practicing STPA for safety and security:
1. It describes the incorporation of safety and security analysis in one
process and discusses the benefits of this;
2. It provides an improved, structural approach for scenario analysis,
concentrating on safety and security;
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3. It demonstrates the utility of STPA for gap analysis of existing designs
in the automotive domain;
4. It provides lessons learned throughout the process of applying STPA and
STPA-Sec.
Controlling a physical process is associated with dependability require-
ments in a cyber-physical system (CPS). Cyberattacks can lead to the de-
pendability requirements not being in the acceptable range. Thus, moni-
toring of the cyber-physical system becomes inevitable for the detection of
the deviations in the system from normal operation. One of the main issues
is understanding the rationale behind these variations in a reliable manner.
Understanding the reason for the variation is crucial in the execution of ac-
curate and time-based control resolution, for mitigating the cyberattacks as
well as other reasons of reduced dependability. Currently, we are using ev-
idential networks to solve the reliability issue. In the present work, we are
presenting a cyber-physical system analysis where the evidential networks
are used for the detection of attacks.
The results obtained from the STPA analysis, which provides the tech-
nical safety requirements, can be combined with the EN analysis, which can
be used efficiently to detect the quality of the used sensor to justify whether
the CPS is suitable for the safe and secure design.
iv
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my supervisor Prof. Sebastian Fischmeister for sup-
port and giving me an opportunity to work on such a unique system. Your




To my family, whom I cannot express enough gratitude for supporting me,
no matter what decision I made.
vi
Contents
List of Figures x
List of Tables xi
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Functional safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Cybersecurity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.5 Organization of the thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
I 5
2 Introduction to STAMP and STPA 6
2.1 STAMP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 STPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3 FuSa of AEB 9
3.1 Background: How the analysis started . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2 The AEB subsystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4 Methodology 13
4.1 Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.1.1 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.1.2 Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.1.3 System level hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.1.4 High-level safety constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2 STPA Step 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
vii
4.2.1 Safety control structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2.2 Unsafe control actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2.3 Safety constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.3 STPA Step 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.3.1 Causal factors and causal accident scenarios . . . 22
4.3.2 Rationale table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.3.3 Refined safety constraints and technical safety require-
ments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5 Results- Lessons learned 27
5.1 Lessons learned by applying STPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.2 Future scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
II 30
6 Importance of cybersecurity in cyber-physical systems 31
6.1 Evidence fusion for state inference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.1.1 Modeling of relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.2 Methodology for inference of current state . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.2.1 Dempster-Shafer theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6.2.2 Belief and plausibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6.2.3 Discernment frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
6.2.4 Mass function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6.2.5 Dempster’s combination rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6.3 Evidential Networks (EN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6.3.1 Operations in the EN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6.3.2 Decision making in EN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7 Cybersecurity attack analysis using EN 41
7.1 High-level states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7.1.1 Normal: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7.1.2 Error in controller command: . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.1.3 Controller malicious: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.1.4 Manipulated communication: . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7.2 Threat scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7.3 Description of the attack scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7.4 Analysis using EN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
viii
7.5 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
8 Results 55





3.1 Threshold distances for the braking system . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1 STPA methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.2 Control loop structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.3 Control loop structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7.1 Block Diagram of the treadmill system . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.2 Architectural diagram of the treadmill . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
x
List of Tables
4.1 Structural approach for causal factor identification . . . . . . 24
6.1 Linguistic scales for mapping design. [14] . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.1 Threat scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.2 Erroneous scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
7.3 TPR and FPR description [14] [26] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
7.4 Evidential network tuple description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
7.5 Variables of the node status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
7.6 Relation implication rules [14] for mapping the sensors and
the mass function Mass Function Relation implication rules . . 53
7.7 Different configurations for sensor reliability [14] (m3, m9, m14
represent the reliability of TM, HIDS, and NIDS respectively) 53
7.8 Table showing the decision probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
8.1 Table for TPR for the combination of HIDS and TM sensors . 55
8.2 Table for FPR for the combination of HIDS and TM sensors . 56
9.1 For GPS sensor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62




We are living in a world where many decisions are made for us by some form
of software. At the same time, the criticality of said decisions is increasing.
Autonomous driving is one example. A number of sensors are used in Au-
tonomous vehicles for the perception of their surroundings, such as RADAR,
Lidar, GPS, Camera,etc.. The presence of the Advanced control systems
helps in getting the sensory information for navigating the appropriate path
by avoiding the obstacles and follow relevant signage. Nowadays, security is
also becoming relevant due to the increased interconnectivity because earlier
physical access to the vehicle was needed to make a security breach. But
now the vehicle can be remotely accessed and attacks can be launched from
anywhere across the globe and simultaneously attack number of vehicles at
the same time causing loss of human life. Thus, safety and security become
crucial aspects as human life is involved in these cases.
1.1 Functional safety
The core of the overall safety of the system is functional safety, which re-
lies on the automatic protection functioning accurately in response to the
information obtained from the data or malfunction in an anticipated way
(fail-safe). The automotive system shall be modeled to precisely control
apparent hardware malfunctions, software failures, human errors, and oper-
ational/environmental stress.
For achieving automotive functional safety, every specified safety function
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shall be carried out properly, and the performance level required of specific
safety function shall meet. A step by step manner described as below to
accomplish the safety function compliance: [12]:
1. Identify the expected safety functions: This implies that the risks as-
sociated as well as safety functions must be identified.
2. Ensure that the design intent is fulfilled by the safety function, includ-
ing under requirements of inaccurate operator data and failure styles.
3. Assess the risk-reduction demanded by the safety function: This shall
comprise of automotive safety integrity level (ASIL) assessment.
4. Conduct functional safety inspections for monitoring and evaluat-
ing the process. This assessment shall indicate that suitable safety lifecycle
management procedures were employed consistently and entirely in the ap-
propriate lifecycle stages of the produce.
5. Verify that the system adheres to the designated ASIL by defining
the possibility of hazardous failure, verifying minimum redundancy levels, as
well as examining the precise abilities of the AV.
The safety of the system cannot be concluded without examining the envi-
ronment and the other systems around with which the system communicates.
Functional safety is substantially end-to-end in reach. In recent times, usu-
ally, the software intensively commands and controls the safety-critical func-
tionalities. Thus, the functionality and accurate performance of the software
are an indispensable part of the functional safety engineering effort, which
at the system level guarantees a tolerable risk.
1.2 Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity refers to preserving programs, networks, and systems from dig-
ital attacks. The cyber-attacks are typically focused on getting access to the
vital information and then modifying, or ruining that information, extorting
money from users, or disrupting regular business means. Implementation of
efficient cybersecurity measures is challenging these days as the number of
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devices are more than humans, and attackers are getting more ingenious [13].
Coordinated cyber attacks in cyber-physical systems (CPS) might cause
cascading failures over large areas of the critical systems operations and are
credible threats. Recently, privacy and security issues of CPSs are becom-
ing critical and urgent. Due to the intimate interplay amongst cyber and
physical spaces in CPS, the effect of cyber attacks is no longer confined to
only the cyberspace but will be passed on to the physical systems as well.
Due to the level of interoperability and scalability which CPSs maintain, at-
tacks and other misfortunes on the CPS will most likely lead to increasing
cascading failures and power outages. CPS networks and their devices have
more complex assumptions and objectives on what needs to be protected in
comparison to the conventional IT in the regular cyber domain.
1.3 Motivation
Nowadays, vehicles are getting more and more reliant on electronics, and
manufacturers are increasingly turning to innovations in electronics and soft-
ware to give them a competitive edge. A modernized luxury vehicle might
possess up to 100 distinct embedded processors running over 100 million lines
of code. With such a huge involvement of software, it is practically improb-
able to get it all right. It has been estimated that 60-70 percent of vehicle
recalls involving software. [30]
The risk posed by the defects in the software, as well as attacks in automo-
tive systems, is intense. This is due to the fact that the software is responsible
for controlling the safety-critical aspects of the vehicle. Therefore, the devel-
opment of safety-critical automotive software requires a precise approach and
strict standards applicable worldwide. [30] The challenges presented above
highlight an opportunity for a platform for addressing the concerns associ-
ated to the safety and security of the autonomous vehicles.
The proposed framework would ideally represent real-world scenarios,
connecting the evidential network to practical applications. In this regard,
autonomous driving seems to be a suitable choice; a wrong decision by the
software would result in an accident that could claim people’s lives. So,
these concerns motivated for carrying out the safety and security analysis
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and approach to contribute to enhancing the efficiency of the current designs.
1.4 Contributions
In this thesis, we describe a functional safety approach to assess the suitability
of the functionality of L4 AV. Work has been carried out to improve the ad-
hoc approach to make the procedure more systematic. A cyber-physical
system that can be used to help validate anomaly detection using Evidential
network approach.
1.5 Organization of the thesis
The thesis is divided into two parts I and II: Part I discusses the work on
the safety analysis of autonomous vehicle, whereas Part B discusses the se-
curity analysis of a cyber-physical system. Chapter 2 provides an insight
into the STPA and STAMP methodology. Chapter 3 discusses the guiding
requirements and description of the design of the system. Chapter 4 provides
a brief design overview of the leading platform, then delve into details that
impacted the system’s adherence to the requirements. Chapter 5 discuss the
results obtained from the analysis and lessons learned for future work. Then,
comes the Part II, Chapter 6 discuss the details of Cyber-physical systems
and some overview of the Dempster-Shafer theory and the Evidential net-
works. Chapter 7 discusses the architecture and the design of the system to
be analyzed for the attacks and validates the system through a case study
by using the EN to detect anomalies and evaluates the performance of the
system. Chapter 8 discusses the results and future work that can improve





Introduction to STAMP and
STPA
Nowadays, ADAS technology is facilitating the AV functionality. The au-
tonomous vehicle’s complex system architecture and the usage of complex
SoC along with the rapid rate of adoption, it is imperative for Tier-1 and
semiconductor suppliers to be persistent in their collaborative endeavor to
design for functional safety and the mitigation of cybersecurity threats af-
fecting functional safety.
“STPA is a new hazard analysis technique and a new model of accident
causation, based on systems theory rather than reliability theory” [4]. STPA
share similar objectives as other techniques of hazard analysis. It is responsi-
ble for recognization of scenarios that could lead to hazardous situations and
thus shall be removed or managed in the initial stage. STPA is modeled to
address increasingly prevalent component interaction accidents, along with
component failure accidents. The accidents can be an outcome of design
imperfections or unsafe interactions amongst non-failing (operational) com-
ponents [3]. Also, the causes identified by other techniques are subsets of the
ones recognized using STPA [4].
2.1 STAMP
STAMP (System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes) is built on sys-
tems theory. It is also known as an accident causality model, which displays
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the theoretical framework for STPA. It extends the conventional design of
causality ahead of a series of directly associated failure events or component
failures, in order to incorporate further complicated processes and unsafe
interactions amidst system components. STAMP does not treat safety as a
failure prevention problem but rather as a dynamic control problem. Some
of the benefits of using STAMP are as follows [11]:
1. It operates top-down first than bottom-up and thus works on very
complex systems.
2. It incorporates causal factors in accidents and different kinds of losses
instead of handling them independently which includes software, humans,
organizations, safety culture, etc..
3. It supports generating more robust tools, such as STPA, organizational
risk analysis, accident analysis, identification and administration of leading
signs of progressing risk, etc.
As STAMP employs to any emanating characteristic, STPA can be uti-
lized for any feature of the system, and thus can be used for cybersecurity
as well. STAMP shall not be confused as an analysis method; rather, as a
model or set of presumptions regarding how accidents happen. It is a sub-
stitute to the chain-of-failure-events which underlies the traditional safety
analysis approaches (such as fault tree analysis (FTA), failure modes and
effects criticality analysis (FMECA), event tree analysis (ETA), and hazard
and operability analysis (HAZOP)).
2.2 STPA
STPA (System-Theoretic Process Analysis) is a comparatively new hazard
analysis method with basis on an extended model of accident causation. In
addition to component failures, STPA believes that accidents can also be
induced by hazardous interplays of system components, none of which may
have failed. The benefits of STPA in comparison to the conventional haz-
ard/risk analysis techniques are as follows [11]:
1. Examination of very complex systems for both intentional and unin-
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tentional functionality is handled using STPA. The “Unknown unknowns”
which were earlier discovered only in operations can be recognized early in
the development method and can either be excluded or mitigated.
2. For the system engineering method and model-based system engineer-
ing, STPA process itself can be easily integrated with the current system
design.
3. STPA can be commenced in early concept analysis and is not like the
traditional hazard analysis methods to assist in recognizing safety require-
ments and the constraints for the system. These can then be used in the
early design stages for the safety and security of the system. Thus, it helps
in reducing the expensive rework associated when design imperfections are
recognized late in advancement or while in operations.
4. Generally, in case of complex systems, the documentation of system
functionality that is often absent but STPA provides it thoroughly.
5. STPA includes all likely causal factors in hazard analysis including the
software and human drivers in the analysis, assuring that the hazard analysis
comprises of all probable potential losses .
STPA has been compared with the traditional hazard analysis methods,
such as FTA, FMECA, ETA, and HAZOP [11]. The comparison reveals
that STPA was able to recognize all the causal scenarios encountered in case
of an accident than the further traditional reviews. Also, STPA recognized
numerous others, generally related to software and non-failure situations that
the conventional methods were not able to recognize. Sometimes, there has
been an accident where the analysts could not reason about; only STPA
found the root cause for reasoning about the accident. Also, STPA turned





The presented work provides an example of applying STPA to an AEB system
primarily designed for functional safety as well as to mitigate risks associ-
ated with cybersecurity vulnerabilities. In this, we have combined functional
safety analysis with safety-relevant security analysis. A methodology is de-
fined to analyze functional safety and cybersecurity, first for the AEB system,
and then for the interactions, searching specifically for security vulnerabili-
ties that might contribute to safety hazards.
The next step in the analysis is the identification of accidents and unac-
ceptable losses, along with accident hazards and unacceptable loss hazards.
We define accident hazards and unacceptable loss hazards, keeping in mind
that the implementation of the AEB system is on an L4 AV. Because of the
level of autonomy of the vehicle, it is safe to assume there is no driver inter-
action for the control of the vehicle or the AEB system. In this analysis, the
system hazards lead to high-level system constraints and further refinement
in STPA Steps 1 and 2.
As we move forward in the analysis, while applying the STPA process,
additional dependencies are going to be identified. Knowing this, we can de-
fine a basic initial high-level control structure which will be updated in later
steps of the analysis. The final control diagram captures the dependencies
from both a safety and cybersecurity perspective.
From the high-level control diagram, the next step is to identify CAs
(Control Actions). Evaluation of potential hazardous sources is shown in the
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refined control diagram, considering all the diagram’s inputs and outputs.
We also considered component failure, but the analysis is not limited to this.
Instead, it presents all aspects of the system’s performance, including cyber-
security features negatively impacting functional safety. From this analysis,
we are defining a set of causal factors and causal accident scenarios.
The novelty of this work lies in the addition of a more systematic ap-
proach to the conventional STPA approach. Identifying the scenarios by
analyzing the components associated with the control flow, and the causal
factors corresponding to each scenario, constitutes the next step. From the
causal factors, we are refining the safety constraints so that they can pro-
duce technical safety requirements (TSRs). Comparison of the TSRs against
an existing autonomous vehicle design (the autonomy vehicles designed as
ASIL-D L4 fail-operational systems) is carried out to identify design gaps for
future improvement. This gap analysis on an existing system demonstrates
how to make the safety, and security design changes part of a continuous
improvement that must be at the heart of every safety culture.
3.1 Background: How the analysis started
The research started by reviewing an existing autonomous vehicle in need of
formal safety analysis. The initial plan was to use a conventional Hazards
Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA) analysis because the group already
had experience using this method. But then we learned about STPA and
decided to assess its suitability for a system of this scale. We had read re-
ports of its application to much larger systems [3] and wanted to determine
whether it would scale to a single, embedded system. Using this approach,
we can generate high-level safety constraints in the early stages of devel-
opment. These constraints can then be tailored to generate detailed safety
requirements on individual components of the analyzed system [8].
To avoid biasing our results, we established that the safety analysis should
be as general as possible without being directly involved with the current
implementation. Thus, the result of this analysis was a list of technical
safety requirements which we could use to perform an analysis of the existing
physical architecture and find possible security and safety issues. We needed








b - Minimum safe distance
c - Collision imminent braking distance
d - Normal braking range
e - Warning mark
Figure 3.1: Threshold distances for the braking system
occupant safety. The vehicle component also had to be a part of a well-
contained function to complete the analysis in the time span available. For
these reasons, we selected the L4 AEB function for our analysis.
3.2 The AEB subsystem
An AEB system of L4 AV aid in avoiding accidents by identifying poten-
tial collisions with the help of a perception system (LIDAR, RADAR, stereo
vision, etc.), computing localization, path planning and determining object
trajectory. If a collision is unavoidable, these systems prepare the vehicle
to minimize the impact by lowering its speed. It is important to note that
the AEB itself is independent of the standard braking system of the vehicle.
Once the AEB has identified a potential threat, it takes control of the brak-
ing system to mitigate the threat. This functionality has a significant effect
on the safety of the vehicle and its occupants, making it an excellent vehicle
subsystem for our analysis.
When looking at the distances between the vehicles as shown in Figure
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3.1, we can establish safety thresholds. The first threshold is the warning
distance that notifies the AV when the proximity between ego vehicle and
the vehicle in front is becoming dangerous; it is recommended for the ego ve-
hicle to start slowing down and increasing the distance between the vehicles.
At this distance, the probability of a collision is low. The next threshold is
the normal braking limit. At this distance, the normal braking system of the
vehicle starts slowing down the vehicle. If the braking system is unable to
slow down the vehicle and increase distance, the vehicle will reach the Colli-
sion Imminent Braking distance (CIBd) and will activate the AEB system.
At this point, the collision probability is high, and the AEB needs to take
immediate action. The AEB’s objective is to stop or slow down the vehicle
before it reaches the Minimum Safe Distance (MSD). The MSD threshold is
the only fixed value amongst all the thresholds. The rest of the values are





The methodology used in the current approach combines safety and security
analysis. This approach considers the functional safety and the security-
affecting safety. Figure 4.1 presents the methodology we are using for the
STPA analysis [4]:




2. Develop control structure diagram
3. Identify unsafe control actions
(a) Unsafe control actions
(b) Corresponding safety constraints
4. Identify the occurrence of unsafe control actions
(a) Hierarchical control structure with the process model
(b) Causal factors, scenarios, and refined safety constraints

















STPA Step 2: 
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Figure 4.1: STPA methodology
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The elements 1(c), 3(b), and 4(c) constitute the STPA analysis report
which defines the safety constraints for a safer and more secure system.
The analysis considers a detailed analysis of various blocks of Figure 4.1.
The constituents of the multiple blocks are referred with an identifier as the
various parts of each block, to serve as a starting ground for the next block.
4.1 Scope
The methodology begins by defining the scope of the analysis. For the system
under consideration, the scope is as follows: “The analysis presents functional
safety analysis for AEB for an AV using vehicle state and environmental data
analysis to contribute to the safety of the passengers and environment.”
4.1.1 Assumptions
After defining the scope, the next step is to define specific conditions that
serve as the basis for analysis development. Thus, the analysis considers
certain assumptions related to the working conditions. These conditions are
also helpful in setting the limits to the analysis. Although, the authors rec-
ognize that it would be beneficial to further analyze the assumptions from
the perspective of an expanded scope.
Here are a couple of examples [5]:
Assumption 1: AEB functions for collisions from all angles, not just
traditional forward collisions (no lateral maneuvering or acceleration
commanded, considering only the brake actuation)
Assumption 2: AEB strives to minimize results attributed to multiple
hazards
Assumption 3: AV tires are not damaged (e.g., tire bursting while
driving)
Assumption 4: The brake system and sensors are properly cared for and
maintained (e.g., clean camera lenses)
Assumption 5: Path prediction of surrounding mobile objects is available
to the AEB system
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Assumption 6: Brake force value is idempotent and does not keep BFC
data history
Assumption 7: Passengers are wearing seat belts and are seated in a
position supportive of braking maneuvers
Assumption 8: All components are working appropriately at the time of
production
Assumption 9: No human interaction during L4 DDT
There are certain logical conditions behind including these assumptions
in the analysis.
General cases assume collision primarily from the front. This analysis,
however, also examines projected paths of side objects relative to the AV
projected path. Hence, Assumption 1. The analysis considers that the tires
are in perfect conditions at the time of analysis. Also, the brake system
and sensors are in perfect condition as well. The analysis considers an as-
sumption about the availability of data from the surroundings, such as for
calculating the collision imminent braking distance and path prediction from
the surrounding mobile objects. Hence, Assumption 5. The analysis does
not consider the human intervention and there is no manufacturing defect
being considered.
Some of the assumptions also consider certain conditions outside the scope
of the analysis. For example:
• The variation in braking performance based on the mechanical condi-
tion of AV tires,
• The sensor performance can be negatively impacted by maintenance or
improper care,
• No manufacturing defects and
• All the components are correctly working as they are quality checked
and properly maintained.
4.1.2 Accidents
An accident is an undesired or unplanned event that results in the loss of a
human life, human injury, property damage, etc. The accidents considered
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in the analysis are [5]:
A1: The AV collides with a mobile object.
A2: The AV collides with an immobile object.
A3: The AV passengers injured without collision.
In defining the accidents, we first discussed various scenarios that the AV
can encounter on the road. Next, we grouped the elements of the scenarios
into different categories: vehicles, pedestrians, cyclists, stationary objects,
etc. As the analysis was evolving, these subsets posed certain problems; for
example, a dustbin could start off as a stationary object, but due to the wind,
could start rolling on the road and become non-stationary. We decided that
instead of defining it by its current state of activity, we can describe it with
its innate ability. So, after refinement, we devised two subsets: mobile and
immobile.
For example: if a mailbox were on an HD map, it would be an immobile
object. If that same mailbox were blown from its bolts by high wind and
became non-stationary, it would be a mobile object requiring identification of
the AD sensor system because it is no longer in its original position as shown
in the HD map. Here, “mobile” is anything that can move, irrespective of
the external influence. Thus, A1 and A2 are considered as two potential ac-
cidents for the analysis. Also, as in the definition of accident, anything that
causes harm to human occupants needs to be considered and is stated as
A3. While sitting inside the AV, under certain circumstances such as sudden
braking (braking deceleration exceeds the safety physics to passengers) can
harm the occupants even when there is no collision.
The current approach is mainly the brainstorming process, and by system-
atically structuring the accident identification, we could consider scenarios
which we might miss while brainstorming. So, we realized that for accident
identification, we could start by defining subsets and then analyzing accidents
as the members of the set. This structuring would give a more systematic
style to the ad-hoc approach of analysis of accidents.
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The next step in the analysis was to define system-level hazards. These
are the system states or set of requirements, which, along with a specific set
of worst-case environmental factors, would probably lead to an accident.
4.1.3 System level hazards
System-level hazards can be the ultimate reason for accidents considered in
the analysis. Some of the hazards are listed below:
AH1: AV does not maintain Minimum Safe Distance (MSD) from a
Forward Mobile Object (FMO).
AH2: AV does not maintain MSD from Prohibited Area (PA).
AH3: AV occupants exposed to unhealthy g-forces in vehicle exceeding the
safety threshold of AV.
Maintaining a safe distance from a vehicle in front is a necessary condi-
tion for AEB. If the vehicle is unable to keep MSD from a forward mobile
object, then this could be the potential cause of an accident and thus become
a hazard that could lead to an accident. The condition for the MSD from an
FMO is a prerequisite for the safety of the AV. There are certain areas which
have restricted access to traffic. The AVs should ensure that they do not
enter such areas, and this has been considered – in the analysis as AH2. PA
can mean any area – military field, recent accident site, landslide site, etc., –
AV’s design is not suitable for L4 functionality in a PA. The thresholds pre-
defined in the system related to BFC (Braking Force Command) shall always
be complied with because they have the potential to harm the occupants if
they exceed a certain threshold level and thus constitute a hazard for the
analysis (AH3).
After the identification of hazards, the next step was to describe high-level
constraints. These prevent the accident from occurring. Thus, HLCs (High-
Level Constraints) provides the set of requirements with which the system
shall comply to be functionally safe. These are defined consistently to have
traceability to the corresponding hazards. Using a consistent structure can
be helpful for the automation of the process. Although this analysis doesn’t
automate the process, consistency in the structure helped in having a sym-
metric structure. During this analysis, we were struggling with the question
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of whether we should generate two different reports relating to safety and
security or whether they should be merged into one. We realized that safety
and security are closely interlinked and therefore merged them into one single
analysis.
For example: If the AV speed sensor information is spoofed (security
threat), then it can lead to a hazardous scenario, ultimately leading to an
accident (safety threat). If due to delayed EPS sensor information (safety
threat), BFC fails to set the braking force = 0 % even after the removal of
earlier hazard, this situation could lead to an unnecessary halt, and thus per-
sonal identifiable information of occupants could be inferred (security threat).
4.1.4 High-level safety constraints
High-level safety constraints define the initial set of safety requirements for
the system. These are considered as the constraints for the requirement
definition.
4.2 STPA Step 1
The identification of unsafe control actions and the corresponding safety
constraints are discussed in this section.
4.2.1 Safety control structure
The control structure is a preliminary process model for the system. It is a
functional decomposition of the system. While working on the control struc-
ture, we faced certain challenges such as level of detail to be considered. For
the sake of a systematic and structured approach, a control structure is the
most crucial thing for safety analysis. We should only consider the blocks
responsible for significant functionality such as controller, actuator, process,
and feedback. The structure is only a generic one and does not consider
the level of granularity. It gives us an overview of how the execution of the
instruction is taking place without considering the complete internal func-
tionality of the various components associated with it.
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Controller: Here, in the analysis, the AEB controller is responsible for
generating and controlling the BFC.
Actuator: In this system, brakes are the actuator responsible for imple-
menting the BFCs.
Controlled process: The AEB controls the braking of the vehicle.
Feedback: The feedback from the vehicle state and the surrounding en-
vironment through the sensors is collected in the state estimator, and thus
constitutes the feedback network.





















Figure 4.2: Control loop structure
After the identification of control actions, the next step is to recognize
the likely causes of unsafe control.
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By following the STPA process diligently, through detailed use of refined
control diagrams, we have a reference to verify that the hazards identification
is adequate, and through continued refinement, a benchmark for the design
to support continuous improvement over the life of the item. During the
analysis, we struggled with the amount of description to be present in the
control loop structure. After creating several revisions of the control loop,
we concluded that it should be generic in form and that a further level of
detail would not add value to the analysis. For the Control Loop, it shall be
in basic generic form, and the later stages shall consider the details.
4.2.2 Unsafe control actions
This step performs the identification of the unsafe control actions each com-
ponent can create, which helps in refining the safety requirements and con-
straints of the system. It will define the reasons of these unsafe control
actions. The UCAs are defined using the control actions that can cause ac-
cidents. So, this analysis is considering two control actions for the analysis
using the control diagram. Here we have taken the BFC (Braking Force
Command) coming from the controller; it is only the command and not the
force. Two states considered in the analysis are BFC disengaged (0%), and
BFC engaged (modulated engagement ranging from 0% – 100%). After the
identification of control actions, the next step is to recognize the likely rea-
sons for unsafe control.
The following are the reason, which could lead to the controller to lead to
unsafe control [8]:
1. A control action is not given when needed for safety.
2. An unsafe control action is provided.
3. A probably safe control action is provided, but it is either provided too
early or too late (at the incorrect time), and the order is incorrect.
4. A control action needed for safety is finished too early or applied for a
prolonged time.
We considered these four categories as a basis for classification of the control
table entries. The unsafe control actions considered in the analysis are listed
here:
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UCA 1: AEB does not provide BFC when AV is at a closer distance than
the CIBd.
UCA 3: AEB does not provide required braking force value when AV is at
a closer distance than the CIBd.
If BFC is not applied even when the AV is within the CIBd from an
object, then this can be a potential unsafe control action, which could lead
to an accident. Hence, UCA 1 belongs to the category of “control action
required, but not provided.” Another UCA is when the BFC is applied, but
the braking force < RDR (Required Deceleration Rate) can also lead to an
accident and is, therefore, an unsafe control action. Similarly, other UCAs
are considered, based upon the time of application of BFC and the total time
span of BFC application. Thus, the UCA table is formed.
4.2.3 Safety constraints
The UCAs help to find reasons behind unsafe actions and guide design en-
gineers to eliminate or control them. We referred to table 1 for UCAs, and
SCs sets the requirements for the systems. The refined safety constraints are
defined in a consistent language as follows:
SC 1: AEB shall provide BFC when AV is at a closer distance than the
CIBd.
SC 3: AEB shall provide required braking force value when AV is at a
closer distance than the CIBd.
4.3 STPA Step 2
This section identifies the reasons behind the unsafe control actions.
4.3.1 Causal factors and causal accident scenarios
After the recognizing the unsafe control actions, we followed STPA Step 2
(Figure 4.2) to identify the probable reasons of unsafe control actions, to un-
derstand the reason of their presence and how to prevent their occurrence [2].
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However, accidents can still take place despite the absence of unsafe control
actions. For example, accurate and reliable control actions are presented, but
not accomplished by other components in the design. The identification of
the causal factors can identify a breach of safety constraints notwithstanding












































Figure 4.3: Control loop structure
To study the scenarios and causal factors corresponding to each UCA, we
made a structured approach:
1. Identify scenarios using UCAs.
2. Identify causal factors corresponding to each scenario by analysing the
components associated with the control flow diagram.
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Blocks Actions Reasons
Sensors, Missing information Due to spoofing,
Controller, Inadequate information component failure,
Actuator, Incorrect information electrical requirements not met,
Controlled
process
Delayed information communication failure
Table 4.1: Structural approach for causal factor identification
We studied the STPA problem as a whole and took parts from the meth-
ods available from various researchers in the field [4], [9]. Then we created a
hybrid to perform the required analysis.
For example: For the scenario table we tried to use the conventional STPA
approach but found that for our analysis the basic scenarios are enough and
other detailed scenarios (scenarios arising from feedback issues, etc.) merely
lead to redundant scenarios. We created twelve scenarios, but when we
started defining the causal factors after three scenarios, they began to re-
peat and became redundant for our purposes. So, we removed the detailed
scenarios and analyzed only basic, generic scenarios.
Table 4.1 provides a systematic and structured approach to analyzing
causal factors. For each of the four blocks in the control structure, we con-
sidered four actions: the information is missing, inadequate, incorrect, and
delayed. The reasons behind these unsafe actions could be spoofing, compo-
nent failure, electrical requirements not met, or communication failure.
For example one of the causal factor considered in the current analysis is:
CF1.4 [6] states that OPP computation fails due to AV speed sensor infor-
mation is missing due to:
CF1.4a: due to spoofing
CF1.4b: due to component failure
CF1.4c: due to sensors electrical requirements not being met
CF1.4d: due to communication failure
Considering the actions and the reasons behind them as presented in the
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table, the causal factors can be identified systematically. The causal factor
analysis is a feedback-based approach. The loop in the figure is iterated
after one complete circle of considering the causal factors is applied. It is
rechecked to see if there persist some scenarios that could lead the system
to an unsafe state. This process is repeated until we get the technical safety
requirements, which could lead the system to a safe state.
4.3.2 Rationale table
The analysis uses a supporting table for the causal factor entries. It verifies
the table entries and explains the thought process behind the causal factors.
It can serve as a reference table for refined safety constraints and technical
safety requirement tables.
Rationale for CF1.1a (Causal Factors). If the OPP (Object Predicted
Path) is calculated incorrectly, there is the potential for the actual object
path to be closer to the AV path than calculated. In this case, the controller
will not send the BFC command, even though the autonomous vehicle’s
predicted path has reached the minimum safe distance from the object’s
predicted path. An image processing performance fault could prevent the
correct calculation required for the identification of an object that is within
the MSD of AV.
It was recognized and accepted that some rationale repeated itself. When
this occurred, we reviewed the causal factor table for correctness and appro-
priateness, and if it still provided a distinctly different CF (Causal Factor),
then the repeated rationale conditions were accepted. The repeated nature is
suitable for automation and desirable, as long as it is applied to each unique
and new CF.
4.3.3 Refined safety constraints and technical safety
requirements
After the identification of reasons behind the UCAs, the constraints on the
system were redefined to eliminate or avoid the causes behind the UCAs.
These new safety constraints created from the causal factors contained the
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rationale tables.
Technical safety requirements: This step is responsible for the im-
plementation of refined safety constraints on the system. One of the TSR
considered in the analysis is [5]:
TSR1.1b: Sensor interface, as defined by the AEB controller architec-
ture, shall be FOP (Fail-operational) and compliant to ASIL D
These represent the technical requirements for a safe system. We used
these TSRs to make the gap analysis for the already existing architecture




This chapter discusses the contribution of this work to making an ad-hoc
STPA more systematic. In the safety analysis, the STPA process has been
used to generate system design requirements for an Automatic Emergency
Brake (AEB) using a top-down analysis approach to system safety. The
STPA analysis provides an improved structured approach for scenario anal-
ysis.
The STPA has benefits but needs to be integrated with the ISO to produce
more efficient results. Doing Functional safety analysis and cyber security
analysis in parallel is efficient and effective, but tool support is required.
STPA is a structured and systematic approach that reduces mental exercise.
5.1 Lessons learned by applying STPA
During the analysis, we learned lessons, which will be useful in structuring
future analysis systematically [6]. The lessons are summarized below:
1. We realized that certain factors could act as a basis for the analy-
sis development, which could have an impact on the definition of the safety
fundamentals. The priority is to define boundaries which are defined as the
assumptions for the analysis.
2. We realized that the identification of accidents and hazards lacks
a systematic approach. SOTIF (Safety Of The Intended Function) details
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from current PAS (Public Available Specification) can be useful for better
structuring. We tried to make the identification of accidents and hazards
systematic by considering the various scenarios in a symmetric way. The
purpose of such a systematic approach is to get rid of the current brain-
storming process and in its place, to establish a concrete, automatic method
of scenario identification for the analysis.
3. From our analysis, we realized that the control diagram must represent
the basic blocks with generic functionalities and terms. The control diagram
is essential and must represent a complete overview of the function under
consideration. During the analysis, the control loop serves a reference block,
and the representation of the control structure keeps the analysis streamlined.
4. We have created one single report considering safety and security haz-
ards that threaten safety. Because the safety and security issues are often
interlinked, one such report, addressing both problems, is an efficient way to
analyze them.
5. The novelty of our current work is the systematic analysis of causal
factors. The approach presented in Table 1 avoids unnecessary mental exer-
cise. Here we predefined certain actions and the possible reasons for those
actions. By correlating actions and reasons, using permutation and combina-
tion, the causal factors are devised. Since one of our motives is to automate
this process using this constructive approach, we can automate the causal
factor generation as well.
6. Making a rationale table for each causal factor table is undoubtedly
useful as it lists the logic behind the causal factors and serves as a reference
for further steps. The cause-effect relationship between unsafe actions is ex-
ploited in the rationale table. The use of rationale tables helps to identify
flaws in the original causal factors and thus works as a checkpoint for those
factors.
7. While using this analysis for finding the gaps in the existing architec-
ture, we realized that any architecture could make use of it. We performed
the analysis independently of the current design and later compared the tech-
nical safety requirements with the existing design. By using a generic rather
than the specific approach, we found that more extensive applications are
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possible. The analysis can be used for evaluating any existing AEB system.
The gaps provided us with the list of changes that the current architecture
might incorporate in order to be safer and more secure.
8. Another important lesson learned is about the residual risk inherent
in any system. Residual risk refers to some risks which are present but ac-
ceptable, in our system. The assumptions made in the analysis are part of
the residual risk. The integration of the outcome of this analysis with ISO
standard is also an area where we should consider the presence of residual
risk which is an integral part of the safety analysis and should be considered
while doing the analysis.
5.2 Future scope
The next step can be a comparative study, comparing the analysis with
standard ISO. Further, the analysis can potentially be expanded beyond the





Importance of cybersecurity in
cyber-physical systems
For a safe and secure system design of real-time advanced engineering sys-
tems, high reliability is of paramount importance. Cyber-attacks affect the
cyber-physical systems (CPS), as they are dependent on information and
communication technology (ICT), and thus lead to improper operation of
the system or device [14]. One of the critical threats in a system is the unde-
tected and unauthorized sensor measurement manipulation. As the outcome
of the system state is dependent on the state estimation so that a successful
attack might cause incorrect or unintended decisions by the machine or the
operator [15]. An attacker could introduce wicked control instructions that
can cause unforeseen or improper behavior in the system, which is not suit-
able for the desired operation. For maintaining the control decision-making
process, automatic measurement of data needs to be supported for provid-
ing state awareness. The various system states such as erroneous, malicious,
and standard system states shall be considered of equal importance as each of
these will affect the behavior of the complete system. The evidential networks
are projected as a resolution for understanding the system states correctly.
An evidential network (EN) [16] is “a graph structure that encodes knowledge
about variables in a system and the relationship between these variables.” So,
as per Dempster-Shafer Theory, the information obtained is encoded in be-
lief structures [17]. Here in the current work, the proposed reasoning unit
provides state awareness which answers about the causality of the system.
With the collaboration of the information provided by different sensors, the
system shall recognize the current state of the system that is caused by the
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underlying events.
For handling the uncertainty in the system, evidential networks are used
in the present scenario as the current design of the treadmill system integrates
various types of sensors. The sensors used in the current design provide var-
ied data to operate with different level of dependability and reliability.
The evidential networks can be used for reasoning about the sensor ev-
idence accurately from the cybersecurity domain. The problem of state in-
ference is processed using the evidential networks in the current work. All
the states: normal, malicious, and erroneous are considered to be of equal
interest as all the varying states are accountable for estimating the perfor-
mance of the entire system. With the provided a-priori information about
the sensor’s reliability, complete analysis regarding the proper combination
of sensor evidence from various kinds of sensors can be done [14]. Thus, for
placing a level of trust on the results obtained through the uncertainty, the
evidential networks can be helpful.
6.1 Evidence fusion for state inference
There were some challenges which we came across while working on the CPS
cybersecurity analysis. One of the obstacles is the correct understanding of
sensory evidence in the explicit context of the system. Evidential network
shows that various types of sensors require to be managed uniquely to as-
sess the complete system state. Insufficient work has been done in analyzing
the challenges of the cyber-physical systems while evidential networks and
DS theory are well examined [14]. Also, the plan of relation implication
rules shall be designed to lessen the error probabilities and complexity of
the system design. The trustworthiness and performance based on a-priori
understanding shall be handled with immense thought and in a distinctive
manner depending upon the format in which the information is prepared.
6.1.1 Modeling of relationship
Relation implication rules are defined in paper [14] as the causal associations
among the different sets of variables and are dependent on expert insight.
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1 Probable (99%) Probable (99%) Probable (99%)
2 Very Likely (85%) Likely (74.5%)
3 Likely (71%) Likely (67%)
4 Possible (57%) Possible (50%)
5 Potentially (43%) Possible (33%)
6 Feasible (29%) Feasible (25.5%)
7 Improbable (15%)
8 Unlikely (1%) Unlikely (1%) Unlikely (1%)
Table 6.1: Linguistic scales for mapping design. [14]
This rule design is a two-step process: The first step involves identifying
the relevant relationships, and the second step is to specify a level of belief
into the represented causality. The first step can be analyzed with the safety
analysis techniques such as STPA [4] and FMEA [19], which provide processes
based on feedback. However, no well-established strategy is available as a
second step. For the formalization of expert knowledge, usage of scale is
proposed by Ou et al. [18] for supporting the human rational. However, no
evidence exists to support the belief that the reduction of the probability
scale to less number of discrete steps limits the performance of the evidential
network. The table above presents three distinct scales that separate the
mapping space into a distinct amount of even parts. For example, in the
table, the “Improbable” is 15% in the 8-element scale, 33.3% in the 4-element
scale, or 25.5% when mapped to the 5-element range. The end cases of the
mapping ( “Unlikely” and “Probable”) stays the same as Zomlot et al. [20]
has already assessed their influence.
6.2 Methodology for inference of current state
The research work applies the theory of evidential networks for the identifica-
tion of the causality between the system states and sensor alerts. Evidential
networks are established on the Dempster-Shafer (DS) theory of evidence.
The current section shall provide an insight to the Dempster-Shafer (DS)
theory and Evidential networks for understanding the system state inference.
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6.2.1 Dempster-Shafer theory
As discussed in [21], the Dempster–Shafer theory (DST) which is also known
as the theory of belief functions or as evidence theory, gives a framework for
reasoning with uncertainty, that has links to other contexts such as imprecise
probability theories and possibility. The degrees of belief is based on the be-
lief functions for one problem on the probabilities for a similar problem. The
mathematical properties of probabilities might not be there in the degrees of
belief themselves; the relation between two questions determine how much
they differ.
The ideas behind Dempster–Shafer theory are linked depending upon
whether the two concerns are independent or dependent. In case of related
question, the degrees of belief are obtained from subjective probabilities,
and in case of independent items of evidence, Dempster’s rule [22] is used
for combining such degrees of belief. The degree of trust in a proposition
depends primarily upon the number of answers (to the related questions)
containing the plan and the subjective probability of each solution.
6.2.2 Belief and plausibility
he framework of Shafer’s work [17] allows for trust related to the hypotheses
to be expressed as intervals, which is restricted by two states, belief (or sup-
port) and plausibility:
belief ≤ plausibility
As a primary step, the subjective probabilities (masses) are allocated to
all subsets of the frame. This is usually the case where only a restricted
number of sets will have non-zero mass (focal elements). The total of the
masses of whole subsets constitutes the belief in a hypothesis. The degree of
belief forms the lower bound on the probability that undeviatingly promotes
either the presented hypothesis or a more precise one. The strength of evi-
dence is generally marked by the Belief (usually denoted Bel) that measures
in support of a proposition p. It varies from 0 (symbolizing no evidence) to 1
(expressing certainty). Plausibility can be obtained by having a total of the
masses of all sets, which has a non-empty intersection with the hypothesis.
Also, plausibility is one minus the total of the masses of all sets having an
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empty intersection with the hypothesis. Belief is an upper bound on the
likelihood that the hypothesis could be accurate. Plausibility means that it
“could possibly be the true state of the system” up to that value, as there is
only enough evidence which contradicts the hypothesis. Plausibility (which
is expressed as Pl) is determined as Pl(p) = 1 - Bel(p̃). It also varies from 0
to 1 and estimates the extent to which evidence in support of (p̃) gives place
for belief in p.
6.2.3 Discernment frame
he D-S evidence theory, as described in [21] commences with establishing
the frame of discernment (FD). The FD is defined as a finite nonempty ex-
haustive set of mutually exclusive possibilities, expressed as X here in the
current explanation, which incorporates all the fundamental proposition of
the problem:
Let us assume that X is the universe: the set describing all the potential
states of a system under attention. The power set of X contains all the po-
tential subsets, perceived as 2X . 2n elements are present in the 2X .
2X has a power set which is the set of every subsets of X, including the void
set Φ.




2X = {Φ, {A}, {B}, X}
The propositions regarding the actual state of the system can be repre-
sented by the elements of the power set, by including all and solely the states
where the proposition is valid.
A belief mass is assigned to every element of the power set. The function
m : 2X −→ [0, 1]
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is known as a basic belief assignment (BBA), in case it has the following
two characteristic features.
First of all, the empty set has zero mass:
m(Φ) = 0
Secondly, the total masses of the rest of the constituents of the power set
is equal to 1:∑
(A∈2X)m(A) = 1
6.2.4 Mass function
The mass m(A) of A, is an assigned member of the power set. It displays
the segment of all applicable and accessible evidence that substantiates the
assertion that the real state relates to A but not to a distinct subset of A.
The content of m(A) does not makes additional claims regarding any of the
subgroups. It is concerned only to the set A, having their masses respectively.
The calculations included in this section are from the D-S theory [21].
The two bounds of a probability period i.e., the upper and the lower can
be established using the mass assignments. This interval is limited by two
non-additive continuous measures known as belief and plausibility and com-
prises the precise probability of a set of interest:
bel(A) ≤ P (A) ≤ pl(A)
The belief bel(A) for a set A is described as the aggregate of all the masses




The plausibility pl(A) is described as the aggregate of all the portions of





Both the measures are linked to each other as discussed below:
Pl(A) = 1− bel(Ā)
Conversely, given the belief measure bel(B) for a finite A, for all subsets B





where ‖A−B‖ is the difference of the cardinalities of the sets.
As is evident from the equations presented above, in case of a finite set
X, for the deduction of one out of three i.e., mass, plausibility, or belief, we
only need one value. Also, in case of an infinite X, the mass function cannot
be well established, whereas the plausibility and belief functions can be well
described.
6.2.5 Dempster’s combination rule
In some specific situations, similar to our case, there arises a problem of link-
ing two independent sets of probability mass assignments. Dempster’s rule
of combination works as a suitable fusion operator where we have diverse
sources, and the sources represent their beliefs on the frame in expressions
of belief constraints. This rule neglects all the contrary (non-shared) belief
and acquires a commonly shared belief among multiple sources by a nor-
malization factor. Cumulative fusion pays great attention to the fact that
no probability mass is ignored and all probability masses from the varied
sources are presented in the derived belief.
The m1 and m2 (set of masses) are used for calculating the combination
(called the joint mass) as presented below:
















6.3 Evidential Networks (EN)
DS theory is used for defining an evidential network (EN), which is essentially
a structure for information description and reasoning. EN is used for rep-
resenting a real-world dilemma in an interlinked system of variables. EN is
used in reliability engineering for dealing with the aleatory, epistemic uncer-
tainties. The conditional dependencies amongst the variables are represented
in a description range which integrates uncertainty as to belief masses [23].





• V = {x1, ..., xn} is the set of variables in the system design;
•
⊕
refers to the combination operator;
• Mv = U{MD : D ⊆ V } is containing the set of all mass functions in the
system design;
• ↓ defines the marginalization operator.
• Xv = {Xv : x ∈ V } is containing the set of frames of the variables;⊕
M represents the combination of all mass functions in the system
model and is referred to as a joint mass function of an evidential network. It
is used for inferring the information regarding higher-level system states by
utilizing the information related to the variable relationships and the low-
level evidence.
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6.3.1 Operations in the EN
The joint mass function is computed using two evidential operations: marginal-
ization and vacuous extension. Let us consider that there are two domains
D and D’, D′ ⊆ D. XD and XD′ denote the frame of discernment for D and
D’ respectively [14].
Vacuous extension: It is the mass function described on the domain
D′,m′D, to domain D is expressed as:
m↑DD′ (A) =
{
m′D(B) if A = B ∗XD/D′
0 Otherwise
where D \ D’ represents the complement of D’ in D.
Marginalization as defined on D is a projection of a mass function ,mD,




IF-THEN rule is usually practiced by domain specialists for providing
their subjective judgments to describe the causality amongst variables, such
as “if G then H.” The degrees of confidence estimating uncertainty shall
be appended to information rules in the case where uncertain knowledge
is involved.For example “if G then H” with a specific degree of trust p ∈
[α, β], 0 ≤ α ≤ β ≤ 1. A relationship is estimated to hold a minimum and
maximum degree represented as α and β. A relation implication rule rep-
resents a relation between consequence and conditions. The framework of
the DS theory can be used for conceptually express the relation implication
rule along with uncertainty measures. Consider that DA and DB are two
disjoint domains connected with frames XDA and XDB respectively, and A
⊆ XDA, B ⊆ XDB. A relation implication rule would be as follows:
A ⊆ XDA => B ⊆ XDB with p ∈ [α, β], 0 ≤ α ≤ β ≤ 1
The ballooning extension mechanism and the principle of minimum com-
mitment can be used for representing the mass function over the product
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space [25] for the above rule can be expressed as XDC = XDB ∗ XDA on
domain DC = DB ∪DA :
The calculations included in this section are from the D-S theory [14].
mDC(C) =

α if C = (B ∗ A) ∪ (XDB ∗ AC)
1−β if C = (BC ∗ A) ∪ (XDB ∗ AC)
β − α if C = XDB ∗XDA
where AC depicts A’s complement in XDA, B
C shows B’s complement in
XDB.
6.3.2 Decision making in EN
The belief functions cannot be used directly for making decisions because
belief is induced by uncertainty, i.e., classified dispositions that manage our
response [24]. Interpreted within a standardized approach, this normally
commences the generation of a model to quantify beliefs that are associated
directly to ”rational” agent behavior within decision contexts. Hence, at the
pignistic level, beliefs are quantified by probability functions. But only when
a choice is actually involved, then the probability functions are employed to
quantify our belief.So, pignistic probability distribution is the counterpart
of the mass functions as per the classical probability theory shall be used
instead. For example, assume that mD is a mass function described on a
subset of variables D beside corresponding frame XD. The pignistic proba-





where |A| shows the absolute number of components in A. BetP is a
measure for quantifying the belief of human in terms of classical Bayesian





The current work is an assessment of the current state of the system based
on the sensor evidence using evidential network modeling. The treadmill
simulates as an infinite long highway where the vehicle moves. The system
has a central workstation that controls the system. A camera is also present
to track the location coordinates of the car. The interactions amongst the
complete system is depicted in Figure 7.1.
7.1 High-level states
For the stability of the treadmill system, it is critical to recognize and define
the current state of the system accurately as the decisions will be crucial
from safety and security point of view. We identified the following system
states:
7.1.1 Normal:









Figure 7.1: Block Diagram of the treadmill system
7.1.2 Error in controller command:
The system has error and is not working appropriately:
• The commands issued by the controller are erroneous (due to human
error or arbitrary fault)
• Workstation issues erroneous commands
• Camera issues erroneous commands
• Car issues erroneous commands
• Treadmill issues erroneous commands
7.1.3 Controller malicious:
The system has malicious activities and is not working appropriately:
• The controller is compromised (malicious)
• Workstation controller is compromised
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• Camera controller is compromised
• Car controller is compromised
• Treadmill controller is compromised
7.1.4 Manipulated communication:
The control commands are as expected but are manipulated in the commu-
nication network:
• Topics from Car to Camera are manipulated in the communication
network
• Topics from Car to Workstation are manipulated in the communication
network
• Topics from Camera to Car are manipulated in the communication
network
• Topics from Camera to Workstation are manipulated in the communi-
cation network
• Topics from Workstation to Car are manipulated in the communication
network
• Topics from Workstation to Treadmill are manipulated in the commu-
nication network
• Topics from Treadmill to Workstation are manipulated in the commu-
nication network
• Topics from Workstation to Camera are manipulated in the communi-
cation network
7.2 Threat scenarios
In this section, we are considering the threat scenarios that might lead to an
attack to the system under considertaion. The malicious code might hijack
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the existing communication link in the system.
The hijacker can identify a vulnerability in the controller and thus gain





The system is considering the following detection mechanism present in
the system for detecting the threats:
1. TM (Telemetry monitor): It monitors the position of the vehicle, the
speed as well as the steering angle.
2. HIDS (Host Intrusion Detection System): It monitors the memory
usage, checksum as well as CPU usage per second.
3. NIDS (Network Intrusion Detection System): It monitors the net-
work for malicious activity
The current analysis is considering the CAPEC attack list. We simulated
the attacks on the physical system, and the results obtained are compared
with the evidential network analysis results.
7.3 Description of the attack scenarios
The various attacks simulated in the research are taken from the CAPEC
list of attacks [29] and the definitions are verbatim in this section as per the
standard CAPEC attack list.
1. Content spoofing (148):“An adversary modifies content to make it con-
tain something other than what the original content producer intended
while keeping the apparent source of the content unchanged.”
Scenario: GPS attack, the location coordinates are changed. Now Car
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Table 7.2: Erroneous scenarios
are changed by the spoofing attack, thus giving incorrect information
to the camera about the current car location.
2. Man-In-The-Middle (384): “This attack can allow the attacker to gain
unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such
as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-
application attacks.”
Scenario: The delay will be added in the car position data. So, the
position will be reported incorrectly because the system will assume
that it is the current location of the car whereas the data is x sec
delayed and now the car is present at some another location.
3. Command injection (248): “An adversary looking to execute a com-
mand of their choosing, injects new items into an existing command,
thus modifying interpretation away from what was intended. Com-
mands in this context are often standalone strings that are interpreted
by a downstream component and cause-specific responses.”
Scenario: Workstation issues command to the car, but due to command
injection threat it is modified, and now it becomes a different action to
perform.
4. Contaminate resource (548): “An adversary contaminates organiza-
tional information systems (including devices and networks) by caus-
ing them to handle information of a classification/sensitivity for which
they have not been authorized.”
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Scenario: The z-parameter of the location does not have any informa-
tion currently, but this attack will exploit the z-parameter to send the
battery information of the car. Thus, sending extra data in the current
topic.
5. Software Integrity attack (184): “An attacker initiates a series of events
designed to cause a user, program, server, or device to perform actions
which undermine the integrity of software code, device data structures,
or device firmware, achieving the modification of the target’s integrity
to achieve an insecure state.”
Scenario: Change in the binary. The attack shall create a copy of the
node and will send information with delay thus making it logy.
6. Flooding (125): “An adversary consumes the resources of a target by
rapidly engaging in many interactions with the target. This type of at-
tack generally exposes a weakness in rate limiting or flow. When suc-
cessful, this attack prevents legitimate users from accessing the service
and can cause the target to crash.”
Scenario: There will be a GPS jamming. Car flooded camera node by
sending a massive number of location data entries (E.g., If earlier the
car location was sent every 100 ms now it is every 1 ms).
7. Excessive allocation (130): “An adversary causes the target to allocate
excessive resources to servicing the attackers’ request, thereby reducing
the resources available for legitimate services and degrading or denying
services.”
Scenario: A large chunk of workstation memory is consumed by the at-
tacker node thus depriving the other nodes from using the workstation.
8. Traffic Injection (594): “An adversary injects traffic into the target’s
network connection. The adversary is therefore able to degrade or dis-
rupt the connection and potentially modify the content. This is not
a flooding attack, as the adversary is not focusing on exhausting re-
sources. Instead, the adversary is crafting a specific input to affect the
system in a way.”
Scenario: The encoder is at fault as the attack generated enough traffic
to manipulate the information in the encoder.
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9. Obstruction (607): “An attacker obstructs the interactions between sys-
tem components. By interrupting or disabling these interactions, an
adversary can often force the system into a degraded state or even to
fail.”
Scenario: The attack can affect the interactions amongst camera and
car by the manipulating the dead spots on the camera.
10. Configuration/Environment Manipulation (176): “An attacker manip-
ulates files or settings external to a target application which affect the
behavior of that application.”
Scenario: Modifying the PID value controller.
11. Malicious Logic Insertion (441): “An adversary installs or adds mali-
cious logic (also known as malware) into a seemingly benign component
of a fielded system. This logic is often hidden from the user of the sys-
tem and works behind the scenes to achieve negative impacts.”
Scenario: The attack makes a copy of the node, edits the command
value of the node. Malicious logic is inserted at the car node.
12. Fault Injection (624): “The adversary uses disruptive signals or events
(e.g. electromagnetic pulses, laser pulses, clock glitches, etc.) to cause
faulty behavior in electronic devices.”
Scenario: Remove the decoder wheel or slow down the vehicle (consid-
ering it to be erroneous scenario).
13. E-stop: A stop button can be pushed, causing the system to stop. It
could be an operator error.
7.4 Analysis using EN
The analysis considers two parameters to categorize the various attacks on
the system. Theses are identified as below:
Control Status (CS): A vulnerability in the controller is exploited by the
attack and thus the attacker gains full control over the treadmill controller:
• Content Spoofing (SP)
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• Command Injection (CI)
• Contaminate Resource (CR)
• Traffic Injection (TI)
• Obstruction (OB)
• Config. /Env. Manipulation (CEM)
• Malicious Logic Insertion (MLI)
• Fault injection (FI)
• E-Stop (ES)
Manipulation (MP) The malicious code might hijack the existing
communication link in the system:
• Man-In-The-Middle (MITM)
• Software Integrity Attack (SIA)
• Flooding (FL)
• Excessive Allocation (EA)
The analysis requires detection mechanism sensor’s TPR (True Positive
Rate) and FPR (False Positive Rate) which are listed in the table 7.3 for the
current work:
Evidential network tuple is:




Due to the combination of various scenarios, several scenarios can occur
(See Appendix). Here, we are considering only one scenario per the four core
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Figure 7.2: Architectural diagram of the treadmill
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S.No. Sensor TPR FPR
1 HIDS (Normal) 30% 5%
2 HIDS (Optimal) 50% 2%
3 HIDS (Low) 15% 10%
4 NIDS 70% 1%
5 TM (Normal) 22.68% 8.75%
6 TM (PFA) 93.33% 42.5%
7 TM (Mirror) 90.78% 40%
Table 7.3: TPR and FPR description [14] [26]
Scenarios Details
VH SP, CI, TI, OB, CEM, MLI, MITM, SIA,
FL, EA, TM, HIDS, NIDS
VS CS, MP
V VHUVS
XV H XSP , XCI , . . . . . . .
XV S XCS , XMP , . . . . . . .
XV XV HUXV S
MV m1,m2, . . . . . . .m18
Operations
⊕
, ↓ , Evidential operations
Table 7.4: Evidential network tuple description
scenarios to continue the analysis.
1. Normal operation: Everything works as per the system design
2. Scenarios-1, The output shall be CS =0, MP = 0
Controller attack: The attack infects the controller directly, and now the
erroneous commands are implemented by the controller itself. The attack is
directly on the controller of the system.
3. Scenarios-7, The output shall be CS =1, MP = 0
Error in Controller : The controller acts in an erroneous manner and dis-
places the car position by 5 cm.
4. Scenarios-2, The output shall be CS =2, MP = 0





1 CS Control Status 0,1,2 0- Normal, 1- Ma-
licious, 2- Erro-
neous
2 MP Manipulation 0,1 0- Normal, 1- Ma-
nipulate
3 TM Sensor TM 0,1 0-Inactive, 1- Ac-
tive
4 HIDS Sensor HIDS 0,1 0-Inactive, 1- Ac-
tive
5 NIDS Sensor NIDS 0,1 0-Inactive, 1- Ac-
tive
6 MLI Malicious Logic
Insertion
0,1 0-False, 1- True
7 FL Flooding 0,1 0-False, 1- True
8 SP Spoofing 0,1 0-False, 1- True
Table 7.5: Variables of the node status
car and workstation with malware but disguises the attack.
5. Scenarios-4, The output shall be CS =0, MP = 1
Malicious operation: The attack infects the communication between the car
and workstation with an attack.
7.5 Evaluation
Different configurations of sensor reliability: We chose 3 different configura-
tions for each sensor, so thus we obtain 27 different configurations for sensor
reliability.
The mass functions are used to derive a conceptual decision based upon
the sensor configurations used in the system. The masses of various sensor
configurations are combined to derive the TPR and FPR probabilities for
making a decision.
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Mass function Relation Implication Rule
m3, m16 Relation between SP and TM
SP =1, TM =1 With confidence between 0.46 and 1
SP =0, TM =0 With confidence between 0.08 and 1
m9, m17 Relation between MLI and HIDS
MLI =1, HIDS =1 With confidence between 0.72 and 1
MLI =0, HIDS =0 With confidence between 0.16 and 1
m14, m18 Relation between FL and NIDS
FL =1, NIDS =1 With confidence between 0.96 and 1
FL =0, NIDS =0 With confidence between 0.52 and 1
Table 7.6: Relation implication rules [14] for mapping the sensors and the
mass function Mass Function Relation implication rules
Scenarios 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
ma3 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.388 0.388 0.388
mb3 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.788 0.788 0.788 0.73 0.73 0.73
ma9 0.72 0.2 0.92 0.72 0.2 0.92 0.72 0.2 0.92
mb9 0.16 0.02 0.32 0.16 0.02 0.32 0.16 0.02 0.32
mb14 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
mb14 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52
Table 7.7: Different configurations for sensor reliability [14] (m3, m9, m14




















































































The analysis of the study shows the performance comparison that can be
done based upon the sensor configuration to come up with the configuration
with a trade-off between the system performance and resources required for
it. Cost is an important factor while choosing the sensors for a system. If
the performance between the two configurations is not significant, but there
is a significant cost difference so we might choose the optimum configuration
sensors. The process has been automated using java code to perform the
simulations and can check a number of configurations before implementing
the architecture. For example, the tables in this chapter shows the different
configurations of HIDS and TM sensors and the outcome of the final TPR
of the system.
Sensor type Bad HIDS Medium
HIDS
Good HIDS
Bad TM 0.600 0.804 0.814
Medium TM 0.619 0.809 0.819
Good TM 0.749 0.877 0.883
Table 8.1: Table for TPR for the combination of HIDS and TM sensors
As can be clearly visualized, one poor accuracy sensor is not affecting
the overall TPR of the complete system. Hence based upon other factors
such as cost and resource requirement we can have a tradeoff and choose the
medium performance sensor if the overall TPR required from the system is
not stringent.
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Similarly, for the FPR, the table below depicts the effect of different
configurations of sensor on the overall FPR.
Sensor type Bad HIDS Medium
HIDS
Good HIDS
Bad TM 0.515 0.529 0.519
Medium TM 0.467 0.482 0.472
Good TM 0.078 0.105 0.087
Table 8.2: Table for FPR for the combination of HIDS and TM sensors
As can be clearly visualized, one poor accuracy sensor does not have a
significant impact on the overall FPR of the entire system. The present
network architecture has been realized as a generic code for simulating the
system design to assess the suitability as per the application requirement.
Hence, Evidential networks can be utilized to evaluate the sensor perfor-
mance and the attack probabilities in a system configuration.
Future scope: This can be extended to real-time system for evaluating
the attack probabilities based upon system performance.
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Chapter 9
Integration of safety and
security
The results obtained from STPA analysis, which provides the technical safety
requirements can be combined with the EN analysis which can be used effi-
ciently to detect the quality of the used sensor to justify whether the CPS is
an ideal fit for the safe and secure design. The STPA gives the technical safety
specifications which shall be satisfied for a safe and secure system. The EN
provides the reasoning using the current work for determining the efficiency
of the system to resist attack. So, for satisfying the security constraints on
the design of AV, EN provides a framework for verifying the components used
in the system design. Thus, the two works presented in the thesis as Part- A
and Part-B converge together to build a reasoning-based relationship where
EN supports the implementation of the STPA results. For example, one of
the TSR is: TSR1.1c- Sensor interface, as defined by the AEB controller
architecture, shall be secure following the recommended practices from SAE
J3061. Now in order to satisfy this requirement EN analysis has been done on
the sensors and based upon the results, the appropriate sensor configuration
as per the requirement is chosen for the design.
57
Future work
The next step can be a comparative study, comparing the analysis with stan-
dard ISO. Further, the analysis can potentially be expanded beyond the AEB
module to cover the complete functionality of AVs .
For the security aspect, comparative analysis of the current approach with
the standard Bayesian analysis could be next step. Also, the analysis can be
potentially expanded to include the real-time systems analysis.
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Te attack probabilities for GPS sensor is calculates using SAE J3061 as fol-
lows:





GPS 1 3 3 0 1 7 5 R3
Table 9.1: For GPS sensor
Using the calculations from [14], the TPR and FPR for various attacks




Ipc mirror 90.78 40.0
Table 9.2: TPR and FPR for TM [26]
Alpha calculation for TM:
Sandwich attack:
PPV (TM=1) = 0.22/ (0.22+0.08) = 0.22/0.30 = 0.73
PPV (TM=0) = 0.92/ (0.92 + 0.78) = 0.92/1.70 =0.54
Calculating alpha:
α (TM =1) = PPV – (1-PPV) = 0.73-1 + 0.73 = 0.46
α (TM =0) = PPV – (1-PPV) = 0.54-1 + 0.54 = 0.08
PFA: 93.33 %, 42.5%
PPV (TM=1) = 0.93/ (0.93+0.42) = 0.93/1.35 = 0.688
PPV (TM=0) = 0.57/ (0.57 + 0.067) = 0.57/0.637 =0.894
Calculating alpha:
α (TM =1) = PPV – (1-PPV) = 0.688-1 + 0.688 = 0.37
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α (TM =0) = PPV – (1-PPV) = 0.894-1 + 0.894 = 0.788
Mirror: 90.78%, 40%
PPV (TM=1) = 0.9078/ (0.9078+0.4) = 0.9078/1.3078 = 0.694
PPV (TM=0) = 0.60/ (0.922 + 0.60) = 0.6/0.6922 =0.866
Calculating alpha:
α (TM =1) = PPV – (1-PPV) = 0.694-1 + 0.694 = 0.388
α (TM =0) = PPV – (1-PPV) = 0.866-1 + 0.866 = 0.73
Alpha calculation for HIDS:
Realistic
PPV (HIDS=1) = 0.3/ (0.3+0.05) = 0.3/0.35 = 0.86
PPV (HIDS =0) = 0.95/(0.95 + 0.7) = 0.95/1.65 =0.58
Calculating alpha:
α (HIDS =1) = PPV – (1-PPV) = 0.86-1 + 0.86 = 0.72
α (HIDS =0) = PPV – (1-PPV) = 0.58-1 + 0.58 = 0.16
Low
PPV (HIDS=1) = 0.15/ (0.15+0.1) = 0.15/0.25 = 0.6
PPV (HIDS =0) = 0.90/ (0.90 + 0.85) = 0.90/1.75 =0.51
Calculating alpha:
α (HIDS =1) = PPV – (1-PPV) = 0.6-1 + 0.6 = 0.2
α (HIDS =0) = PPV – (1-PPV) = 0.51-1 + 0.51 = 0.02
High
PPV (HIDS=1) = 0.5/ (0.5+0.02) = 0.5/0.52 = 0.96
PPV (HIDS =0) = 0.98/ (0.98 + 0.5) = 0.98/1.48 =0.66
Calculating alpha:
α (HIDS =1) = PPV – (1-PPV) = 0.96-1 + 0.96 = 0.92
α (HIDS =0) = PPV – (1-PPV) = 0.66-1 + 0.66 = 0.32
Alpha calculation for NIDS:
PPV (NIDS =1) = 0.7/ (0.7+0.01) = 0.70/0.71 = 0.98
PPV (NIDS =0) = 0.99/ (0.99 + 0.3) = 0.99/1.29 =0.76
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Calculating alpha:
α (NIDS =1) = PPV – (1-PPV) = 0.98-1 + 0.98 = 0.96
α (NIDS =0) = PPV – (1-PPV) = 0.76-1 + 0.76 = 0.52
Calculation of Domain knowledge (Dempster Shafer):
For HIDS: Realistic
ma9 ((1,1), (1,0), (0,0)) = 0.72
ma9 ((1,1), (1,0), (0,1), (0,0)) = 1- 0.72 = 0.28
mb9 ((0,0), (1,1), (0,1)) = 0.16
mb9 ((1,1), (1,0), (0,1), (0,0)) = 1- 0.16 = 0.84
Domain knowledge:
m9 ((0,0), (1,1)) = 0.1152
m9 ((0,0), (1,1), (0,1)) = 0.0448
m9 ((0,0), (1,1), (1,0)) = 0.6048
m9 ((0,0), (1,1), (1,0), (0,1)) = 0.2352
For HIDS: Low
ma9 ((1,1), (1,0), (0,0)) = 0.2
ma9 ((1,1), (1,0), (0,1), (0,0)) = 1- 0.2 = 0.8
mb9 ((0,0), (1,1), (0,1)) = 0.02
mb9 ((1,1), (1,0), (0,1), (0,0)) = 1- 0.02 = 0.98
Domain knowledge:
m9 ((0,0), (1,1)) = 0.004
m9 ((0,0), (1,1), (0,1)) = 0.016
m9 ((0,0), (1,1), (1,0)) = 0.196
m9 ((0,0), (1,1), (1,0), (0,1)) = 0.784
For HIDS: High
ma9 ((1,1), (1,0), (0,0)) = 0.92
ma9 ((1,1), (1,0), (0,1), (0,0)) = 1- 0.92 = 0.08
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mb9 ((0,0), (1,1), (0,1)) = 0.32
mb9 ((1,1), (1,0), (0,1), (0,0)) = 1- 0.32 = 0.68
Domain knowledge:
m9 ((0,0), (1,1)) = 0.294
m9 ((0,0), (1,1), (0,1)) = 0.0256
m9 ((0,0), (1,1), (1,0)) = 0.6256
m9 ((0,0), (1,1), (1,0), (0,1)) = 0.054
For NIDS
ma14 ((1,1), (1,0), (0,0)) = 0.96
ma14 ((1,1), (1,0), (0,1), (0,0)) = 1- 0.96 = 0.04
mb14 ((0,0), (1,1), (0,1)) = 0.52
mb14 ((1,1), (1,0), (0,1), (0,0)) = 1- 0.52 = 0.48
Domain knowledge:
m14 ((0,0), (1,1)) = 0.4992
m14 ((0,0), (1,1), (0,1)) = 0.0208
m14 ((0,0), (1,1), (1,0)) = 0.4608
m14 ((0,0), (1,1), (1,0), (0,1)) = 0.0192
For TM: Sandwich
ma3 ((1,1), (1,0), (0,0)) = 0.92
ma3 ((1,1), (1,0), (0,1), (0,0)) = 1- 0.92 = 0.08
mb3 ((0,0), (1,1), (0,1)) = 0.32
mb3 ((1,1), (1,0), (0,1), (0,0)) = 1- 0.32 = 0.68
Domain knowledge:
m3 ((0,0), (1,1)) = 0.294
m3 ((0,0), (1,1), (0,1)) = 0.0256
m3 ((0,0), (1,1), (1,0)) = 0.6256
m3 ((0,0), (1,1), (1,0), (0,1)) = 0.054
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For TM: PFA
ma3 ((1,1), (1,0), (0,0)) = 0.37
ma3 ((1,1), (1,0), (0,1), (0,0)) = 1- 0.37 = 0.63
mb3 ((0,0), (1,1), (0,1)) = 0.78
mb3 ((1,1), (1,0), (0,1), (0,0)) = 1- 0.78 = 0.22
Domain knowledge:
m3 ((0,0), (1,1)) = 0.2886
m3 ((0,0), (1,1), (0,1)) = 0.4914
m3 ((0,0), (1,1), (1,0)) = 0.0814
m3 ((0,0), (1,1), (1,0), (0,1)) = 0.1386
For TM: Mirror
ma3 ((1,1), (1,0), (0,0)) = 0.38
ma3 ((1,1), (1,0), (0,1), (0,0)) = 1- 0.38 = 0.62
mb3 ((0,0), (1,1), (0,1)) = 0.73
mb3 ((1,1), (1,0), (0,1), (0,0)) = 1- 0.73 = 0.27
Domain knowledge:
m3 ((0,0), (1,1)) = 0.2774
m3 ((0,0), (1,1), (0,1)) = 0.4526
m3 ((0,0), (1,1), (1,0)) = 0.1026
m3 ((0,0), (1,1), (1,0), (0,1)) = 0.1674
Failure rate for watchdog detector:
Number of lines of code * 25/1000
since it has 500 lines of code so the probability of error is 2.5% or 0.025
Failure rate for switch: [28]
[λ, λ] = [0.034, 0.023]
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So [60, 40] = [ 0.566, 0.377, 0.057] (lower and upper probs)
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